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(White) lies and (pieux) mensonges:
ethnolinguistic elaborations
on not telling the truth
The fact that most European languages have a word similar to the verb
lie has led many to believe that lying is a universal cognitive category, that
all human beings have an intuitive understanding of what it means to lie, and
that all forms of discourse involving a lack of truth can be analysed as forms
of lying, wherever they occur. This is a myth. Within Europe itself, there are
differences, and these become more outspoken once we move further away.
Even a Melanesian creole such as Bislama, in spite of being English-based,
has no strict equivalent to the verb lie; the closest it gets is by means of the
verb giaman, which, unlike to lie, refers to a fairly common, sometimes even
a necessary course of action. On the other hand, whereas, at least from an
Anglo point of view, lying is mostly felt to be morally reprehensible, there are
instances that are not as straightforward. In English, lies that are deemed less
bad than others are often referred to as white lies. Other terms exist, but this
one is by far the commonest and has a high degree of cultural salience. Does
the concept exist in other languages, e.g. French? The phrase pieux mensonge
comes to mind. I propose to show that white lies and pieux mensonges are
overlapping categories, but that they carry different connotations, which I will
spell out using a tool known as the Natural Semantic Metalanguage.
Key words: lying; white lies; pieux mensonges; Natural Semantic
Metalanguage; cross-cultural differences
This paper is about lying, lies, white lies, and the latter’s closest French
equivalent, viz. pieux mensonges, which literally means ‘pious lies’. Before
attempting to make sense of white lies and pieux mensonges, it seeks to
demonstrate that not everybody lies, and that some “lies” are not as bad
as others. It also raises the question why the ones that are not as bad
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are almost invariably called white in English and quite often pieux in
French.1
Not everybody lies
Those who say that “lying is universal” and that “to lie is to be human”
(Phillips 2010) operate on the assumption that all human beings have an
intuitive understanding of what it means to lie. The fact that, as Wierzbicka
(2014: 58) puts it, “most, if not all, European languages have a word com-
parable in meaning to ‘lying’ ” lends further credence to that assumption,
which can also be illustrated by the following excerpt from the abstract of
a recent paper:
Without the lie, language would not be as complex as it is, linguistic communication
would be much simpler, the cognitive requirement of language would not be so heavy, and
its role in society would be radically different. [. . . ] Lying and language came to be entan-
gled in a never-ending co-evolutionary spiral, which changed the map of communicative
relationships within communities, and participated in shaping our languages, societies,
cognitions and emotions. We evolved for lying, and because of lying, just as much as we
evolved for and because of honest communication. (Dor 2017: 44)
Did we really? The assumption that all humans operate with the notion
embedded in the English verb to lie is one that cannot be taken for granted.
Indeed, it needs to be challenged. Wierzbicka, for one, has repeatedly and
forcefully done so, pointing out, for instance, that Russian “has two words,
not one, corresponding, roughly speaking, to the English verb lie (vrat’
and lgat’ ), and these two words don’t mean the same thing” (Wierzbicka
2014: 58). Both are “widely used” (Wierzbicka 2002: 418) and coexist with
“the common expression govorit’ nepravdu” (ibid.), which at a literal level
translates as ‘to tell un-truth’.
It could of course be argued (cf. Hilferty 1997) that, in English, there
is more than one verb as well. The one that comes immediately to mind is
fib, which appears however to be less widely used than lie. The two do not
mean exactly the same either. Hilferty writes as follows:
Fib differs from lie in at least three respects: First, fib is the more colloquial of the
two expressions and is therefore more suitable in the context of informal speech situations.
Second, fib scores lower on a scale of relative importance than does lie; hence, it is
considered to be a less-serious offense, in the sense that it is something that one could
be more indulgent of, if need be. A third difference has to do with the fact that fib is
1 I am not lying when I say my heartfelt thanks go to the two reviewers of this paper,
whose suggestions have been very helpful in making further improvements. Needless to
say, all remaining imperfections are mine.
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a subordinate concept of lie, rather than the other way around (that is, all fibs are lies,
but not all lies are fibs). (Hilferty 1997: 56)
There is overlap between the verbs fib and lie, as there is overlap between
the verbs vrat’ and lgat’ (Wierzbicka 1990: 352; 1996: 153). Gladkova (2011:
577–578) explains the difference between vrat’ and lgat’ as follows:
Lgat’ refers to a conscious distortion of truth and has a strong negative connotation.
Vrat’ refers to a less serious distortion of truth which can be done for the sake of
entertainment and is less negatively evaluated.
At first blush, lgat’ seems to cover the same ground as lie, which also
refers to a “conscious distortion of truth”. The same cannot be said with
respect to vrat’ and fib, however. Wierzbicka’s (2002: 418) description of
vran’e, the “widely recognized speech genre” related to the verb vrat’, clearly
does not apply to the speech act of fibbing in English. Unlike vran’e, fibbing
is not a form of “verbal art” (ibid.) and is never produced, in Gladkova’s
words, “for the sake of entertainment”. On closer inspection, even lgat’ and
lie differ in meaning: the utterance John lied to Mary, and I think he did the
right thing is perfectly alright in English, but its translation into Russian
using the verb lgat’ seems to be less straightforward. My Russian informant’s
intuition (or rather lack thereof) was such she admitted to resorting to an
internet search to help her make up her mind. There is thus no clear-cut
one-to-one mapping between the English and the Russian verbs.2
What does this mean? Strictly speaking, it means that native speakers
of Russian cannot “lie”. They cannot “fib” either. They may do so “from an
Anglo point of view”,3 but what they are doing from their own perspective
is either lgat’ or vrat’ (or govorit’ nepravdu). It also means that statements
to the effect that traditionally, in Russian culture, “it is not regarded as
acceptable to lie to another person under any circumstances” (Wierzbicka
2002: 404) and that, in Russian, “talk about lying and fibbing enjoys an
exuberant vocabulary” (Pesmen 2000: 64) are shorthand at best. It would be
more accurate to say that traditionally, in Russian culture, it is not regarded
as acceptable to lgat’ to another person under any circumstances and that,
in Russian, talk about lgat’ and vrat’ enjoys an exuberant vocabulary – but
such statements, of course, do not mean much to someone who does not
understand Russian.
2 On lying in Russian, see also Mondry and Taylor (1992).
3 One of Wierzbicka’s favourite phrases, which she uses all the time and which others
often do not, although they should, because their observations cannot be expected to
reach any further. “Anglo” is a reference to Kachru’s “Englishes of the inner circle”.
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On the other hand, if Russians wish to understand the exact meaning
of the English verb lie, they need to be provided with a definition that
makes sense to the greatest possible number of native speakers of English.
In that regard, a paraphrase such as Meibauer’s (2017: 33), according to
which lying is “a cognitive ability serving the manipulation of the truth and
the deception of interlocutors” (see also Meibauer 2014), is of little use: it
is not a definition in the true sense of the word since it relies on complex
language that, for the average native speaker, because of its complexity,
is less meaningful than the relatively simple (but by no means universal)
concept of “lying”. Having been written in technical English, it can only
be translated (if it can be translated at all) into technical Russian, which
propels it beyond the reach of the average native speaker of Russian. To
Meibauer’s credit, it must be added that, later on in his paper, he proposes
an alternative definition that goes as follows:
Lying is a speech act where a speaker S utters a sentence o with a propositional
content p. Then, the following conditions hold:
a. S does not believe that p is true.
b. S wants the hearer to believe that p is true. (Meibauer 2017: 37)
This definition is not very different from the one proposed almost four
decades ago by Coleman and Kay (1981: 28), whose idea of a “prototypical
lie” involved a proposition P asserted by a speaker S to an addressee A, such
that “P is false”, “S believes P to be false” and “S intends to deceive A”. In
terms of intelligibility and translatability, it is a definite step in the right
direction, even though there is still too much jargon in the introductory part:
terms such as “speech act” and “propositional content”, and their closest
Russian equivalents, do not mean much to the non-expert.
The best definitions are those that are accessible to cultural insiders and
outsiders alike, irrespective of their level of education. They are phrased
in simple and easily translatable words and phrases that are as devoid as
possible of cultural bias, which is something that cannot be said of definitions
such as Meibauer’s, nor of the very word lie, which – as was mentioned before –
does not have an exact counterpart in every other language. Wierzbicka’s
“explications”, formulated in the Natural Semantic Metalanguage or NSM
for which she is known throughout the world, may not be perfect, but they
have a much better chance of being universally intelligible. Compared to
most other definitions in the scholarly literature, they are disarmingly simple.
Prompted by Coleman and Kay’s (1981) paper on “Prototype semantics: The
English word lie”, and improving on an earlier attempt in Wierzbicka (1985:
342), Wierzbicka (1990: 351-352; 1996: 152) proposed the explication in [A]:
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[A] X lied to Y
X said something to Y
X knew it was not true
X said it because X wanted Y to think it was true
[people would say: if someone does this, it is bad]
A more recent explication (Wierzbicka 2006: 45) is provided in [B]:
[B] when X said it X was lying
X said something like this: “I want you to know that Z” to someone
X knew that Z was not true
X wanted this someone to think that Z was true
[A] and [B] are not meant to coexist, nor is either of them meant to
coexist with the earliest attempt in Wierzbicka (1985): they are different
takes on the same verb. This means we have to either make a choice, or
compare the respective merits of each and come up with some sort of a blend.
Overall, my own preference goes to something like explication [A]; what I do
not like about [B] is the reference to “Z”, a proposition in the first line of the
explication that, all of a sudden, turns into a noun in the other two. At the
same time, what I do like about [B] is the lack of an “axiological element”
(Kalisz 1998: 187) or a “social evaluation” (Goddard 1998: 132; 2003: 408)
reflecting “the people’s view” on the act of lying, as in the fourth and last
line of [A], where the square brackets indicate the information provided
is of a secondary nature, not that it is “optional” (as assumed by Hilferty,
1997: 54). I am not convinced that such a component, whatever form it
takes,4 is part of the invariant meaning of the verb lie. As mentioned before,
there is nothing wrong with the utterance John lied to Mary, and I think
he did the right thing. Fleshing out the idea that lying is bad would result
in ungrammaticality: John lied to Mary, which is bad, *and I think he did
the right thing. Replacing and with but removes the ungrammaticality and
confirms the idea that lying is normally bad (but not on this occasion);
however, the “and sentences” clearly indicate that lying is not intrinsically
bad. How people feel about lying – what they think about it – has nothing to
do with the meaning of the word; this kind of information should instead be
4 Goddard (1998: 132) proposes an explication that replaces the conditional would
say of Wierzbicka’s “social evaluation” with a simple think (“people think it is bad if
someone does this”). Levisen (2016: 48) reproduces the explication he found on the Griffith
University NSM homepage (http://bit.ly/1XUoRRV), which is by and large the work
of Cliff Goddard. Its “social evaluation” component has been further expanded to read:
“people think that it is bad if someone does something like this” (emphasis added, B.P.).
There are other differences between the explications referred to here and those discussed
above, but they are not immediately relevant to the argument.
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captured in a cultural script (see below). I therefore believe the explication
should run as in [C]:5
[C] X lied to Y
X said something to Y
X knew that it was not true
X said it because X wanted Y to think like this: “it is true”
[C] is easy to translate into other languages, much more so than
Meibauer’s (2017) definitions; the risk of distortion is minimal because
the explications rely on only the simplest words, empirically tested for trans-
latability in dozens of genetically and typologically unrelated languages
from all over the world. In some of these languages, there is simply no verb
that comes semantically close to lie. In general terms, the further away we
move from the “sphere of Judeo-Christian and Greco-Roman civilization”
(Wierzbicka 2014: 59), the more salient the differences become. Thus, in
Pitjantjatjara, a language spoken in the Australian Western Desert, the
closest counterpart of lie is an adverb meaning, among other things, ‘false,
wrong, untrue’ (ibid.). Even a Melanesian creole such as Bislama – in spite
of being English-based – has no strict equivalent to the verb lie; the closest
relevant Bislama verb is giaman, for which Levisen (2016: 53) has recently
proposed a detailed NSM explication showing that giaman is fairly common,
sometimes even necessary, and that it can be to someone’s advantage to
engage in it. The author’s conclusion deserves to be quoted in full:
If speakers of Anglo-English understand giaman in terms of “lying” (as many mis-
sionaries did in the past, and many other Europeans in the Pacific with them), they
unwittingly distort the Melanesian and neo-Melanesian linguistic worldviews, which do
not operate with the “lying” model but with the “giaman model”, and, as we have seen,
giaman is just as culturally constituted and constructed as lying. In my analysis, the
neo-Melanesian speech act of giaman is not a category of “lying”, nor is it a Melanesian
“way of lying”. The point is this: speakers without a category for “lying” do not “lie”, just
as speakers without a category for “giaman” do not “giaman”. (Levisen 2016: 55)
Some lies are not as bad as others, but they are still lies
Let us now narrow our focus and move on to lying from an Anglo point of
view. Although, in Anglo culture(s), lying is mostly felt to be reprehensible,
there are instances that are not quite as straightforward. Some lies are not as
5 The syntax of the explication has been brought in line with what is currently known
about the universal combinatorial possibilities of the metalanguage’s conceptual building
blocks, referred to as “semantic primes”.
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bad as others, as attested by the acceptability of utterances such as John lied
to Mary, and I think he did the right thing. Lies may even be unavoidable,
as pointed out, for instance, by the American sociologist Harvey Sacks in
one of his most famous essays, significantly entitled “Everyone has to lie”
(Sacks 1975). There is no denying that this is a somewhat “blunt” assertion
(Meibauer 2017: 34), which is why the following observation, made sixteen
years later by Sacks’ quasi-namesake, social psychologist Leonard Saxe, may
sound more acceptable to some:
An individual obsessed with being totally honest might, in fact, become a social
isolate. From the time one wakes in the morning and responds to questions about how
one feels, to our relationships with colleagues and friends, complete honesty could make
relationships tedious, if not conflict laden. (Saxe 1991: 414),
For instance, it does not look like a good idea to tell all and sundry you
do not want to accept their dinner invite, join them on their outing, etc.
The preferred option is to make excuses, for instance by invoking a “prior
commitment”: this is seen as a very commendable “escape”, it is totally
innocent, and in fact culturally valued – so much so that, in English, there
is a special word for this practice. Lies that are deemed less bad than others
are often referred to as white lies. Other terms are used as well, but this
one is by far the commonest, and it has a much higher degree of cultural
salience than comparable (but by no means identical) terms such as social
lie, noble lie and pious lie.
It has been argued (see e.g. Wierzbicka 1985, 1990, 1996) that social
lies such as What a lovely party! and How nice to see you! (Wierzbicka’s
examples, borrowed from Coleman and Kay 1981: 29) are not really lies.
Presumably, a similar argument could be made with reference to noble lies,
pious lies and white lies as well. Wierzbicka’s critics (e.g., Hilferty 1997; Kalisz
1998) were not convinced – and I believe, rightly so. The argument is based
on the idea that lies are bad (or that lying is bad), whereas social lies etc.
are generally felt to be morally less reprehensible (or even not reprehensible
at all). However, if there is no room for an “axiological element” or a form
of “social evaluation” in the explication for the verb lie (as I have argued),
it is impossible to remove social lies etc. from the spectrum of lies. They are
lies, precisely because they are uttered in the knowledge that what is said
is untrue and with the intention of making the addressee think the opposite
(i.e., that what is said is true). What makes a lie a social lie etc. needs to
be spelled out. This will be done for so-called white lies in the next section.
Does the concept of a white lie exist in other languages? After what was
said in the early parts of this paper, it should not come as a surprise that, in
Russian, at least according to Wierzbicka (2002: 404), “there is no expression
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[. . . ] corresponding to the English ‘white lies’ ”.6 What does exist, at least
in traditional Russian culture, is a cultural script, referred to by Wierzbicka
(2002: 408) as the “PRAVDA script”, in recognition of the fact that it details,
in NSM, the traditional Russian approach to truth (pravda) and untruth
(nepravda). The script in [D] is identical to Wierzbicka’s PRAVDA script, ex-
cept in lines (c) and (e), where “wants to say” has been replaced with “says”.7
[D] The PRAVDA script (in universal human concepts)
a. people can say two kinds of things to other people
b. things of one kind are true
c. it is good if someone says things of this kind to other people
d. things of the other kind are not true
e. it is not good if someone says things of this other kind to other people
f. it is bad if someone wants other people to think that these things are true
The PRAVDA script is subsequently (Wierzbicka 2002: 419) referred
to as the “Russian ‘truth and untruth’ script” and repeated verbatim, with
the exception of the verb can in the first line, which has gone missing. The
earlier version, revised as in [D], is probably slightly better, as the idea is
not to describe what people actually do say, but what they “can say” (if they
want to). More importantly, though, whereas from a traditional Russian
cultural perspective the PRAVDA script may seem “quite natural” (ibid.),
it is anything but universal: as it turns out, “there are many societies in
which this script would seem far too extreme, far too polarized, and in which
people would not wish to identify with it at all” (ibid.). Many of today’s
Russians may find it too extreme as well, a view that is certainly also widely
shared in Anglo culture(s), where the notion of a white lie is salient and
white lies are not merely condoned but culturally valued. In Anglo culture(s),
the common occurrence of the collocation white lie shows that ‘speaking
the truth’ is not the “absolute nonnegotiable moral imperative” (Wierzbicka
2002: 412) that it is (or may once have been) in Russian culture. “From an
Anglo point of view, the universe of discourse is not as black-and-white as it
is from a [traditional; B.P.] Russian point of view but contains many colors
and many shades” (ibid.).
6 My Russian informant, however, drew my attention to the two expressions lozh’ vo
spaseniye and svyataya lozh’, which she found documented by Russian lexicographers.
The noun lozh is related to the verb lgat’. The first of the two expressions refers to a lozh’
made “for the sake of salvation”; the second, to a “holy” lozh’.
7 It seems a little curious to say that what is good (or not good) is that people simply
want to tell other people things that are true (or not true); what really matters is what
they actually say, especially in view of what is said in line (f), where, for people to think
that certain things are true, they must actually have been said rather than intended to
be said.
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What about other European languages? Do they have a term that is
equivalent to the English white lie? According to Wierzbicka (1991: 103),
German, French, Italian and Polish do not. It did not take long for that
claim to be both endorsed and qualified by Béal (1993: 104–105), who, in
a comparative study of French and Australian cultural values, confirmed
the French do not talk about mensonges blancs, but instead refer to pieux
mensonges.8 Béal was thinking of European French, though. The term
mensonge blanc does exist, but appears to be used in Canadian French only,
where it is in all likelihood a calque from American English and is treated
accordingly by lexicographers such as Parmentier (2006: 24), who recommend
pieux mensonge as a better alternative. Neither Béal nor Parmentier establish
a link between the terms pieux mensonge and pious lie, which are likely to
share a common ancestry. Both are no doubt translations of the Medieval
Latin term pium mendacium; the latter has also given rise to the German
phrase fromme Lüge, which has lost its currency in favour of the more
common term Notlüge, and to the Spanish phrase mentira piadosa (Travis
2006).
How different are white lies and pieux mensonges? In what follows,
we formulate full-fledged explications for both that show that, in spite of
considerable similarity, there are some differences as well. The explication
for pieux mensonge may well apply to mentira piadosa as well, but that
question shall not be pursued here.
Making sense of white lies
White lies are widely discussed, both in serious scholarly work (Malloch
2001; Bryant 2008; Argo and Shiv 2012; Erat and Gneezy 2012; Biziou-van
Pol et al., 2015; etc.) and in the media, whether traditional or online. Here
are some examples, taken from the internet:
Oftentimes a white lie can seem the perfect tool to keep the world around you
balanced.
“Do I look OK in this outfit?” The answer should always be yes, we’re told.
“Do you want to meet up for drinks tonight?” When we’re reluctant, we deliver a cover
up story – “I’m behind on work!” or “I’m not feeling well” – because it avoids hurt feelings.
(http://www.businessinsider.com/the-right-and-wrong-time-to-use-a-white-lie-
2016-6?IR=T; accessed 11 Dec 2017)
Sometimes you’re running late and you don’t want your friend to rethink hanging
out, so you tell them you’re much closer than you actually are. Then you get there and
8 Mensonge pieux is used as well.
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pretend to look a little exasperated. Maybe throw in a “Stupid trains are never on time”
just for good measure. It’s a tiny white lie, so what’s the harm?
(http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/entry/national-honesty-day n 7184412;
accessed 11 Dec 2017)
White lies were not always as salient in Anglo cultures as they are
today. Like the decline of performative phrases (such as I ask you) and the
avoidance of bare imperatives, gradually replaced with “indirect speech acts”
and “suggestions”, etc., the rise of the white lie is no doubt related to changes
in modern Anglo culture, where the emphasis is on smooth interpersonal
relations, linked with the need “not to be unpleasant” to the many people one
comes in contact with, rather than on saying in a straightforward manner
what one really thinks and feels (Anna Wierzbicka, personal communication).
Wierzbicka (1991: 104) captured this “Anglo-American attitude to truth”
“very roughly” as in [E]:9
[E] The Anglo-American attitude to truth
a. it is usually bad to say what is not true
b. sometimes it is good to say what is not true
c. if nothing bad can happen to anyone because of this
According to the introduction to the second edition (2003) of Wierzbicka
(1991), the idea of cultural scripts had not yet been formalized in the early
1990s, but has since “come into its own as a full-fledged theory” (p. xvii).
[E] is one of these cultural scripts avant la lettre. It can be fleshed out as in
[F], which builds on the same template as [D] and integrates elements from
Travis’s (2006: 209) cultural script for “being untruthful in small ways” in
Colombian Spanish, where the concept of mentira piadosa is arguably as
culturally salient as the concept of a white lie in Anglo cultures.
[F] A cultural script for the Anglo attitude to truth
a. people can say two kinds of things to other people
b. things of one kind are true
c. it is good if someone says things of this kind to other people
d. sometimes, it can be good if someone does not say things of this kind to someone else
e. if this someone else can feel something bad because of it
f. things of the other kind are not true
g. it is not good if someone says things of this other kind to other people
h. sometimes, it can be good if someone says things of this other kind to someone else
i. if this someone else can feel something good because of it
Components (a), (b) and (f) are common to all cultural scripts for
attitudes to truth, including the (traditional) Russian script in [D] and the
Anglo script in [F], since there is no (inhabited) place in the world where
9 The adverb usually in component (a) has never been regarded as a prime.
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people cannot say two kinds of things to other people: things of one kind
that are true and things of another kind that are not. Even components (c)
and (g) retain the wording used in [D]. They pitch the norms about what is
good and not good to say (or not to say) at the individual level (someone)
rather than at the level of the entire community (people), since they can only
apply at the community level provided they are upheld by sufficiently high
numbers of individuals within the community. The norms are arguably the
same, but the degree to which they are upheld varies from one languaculture
to the next, as spelled out for Anglo cultures in components (d)-(e) and
(h)-(i).
[G] is an attempt at explicating the meaning of the term white lie against
the backdrop of the cultural script in [F].
[G] “a white lie”
a. something of one kind, something people say
b. people often say something of this kind to someone when they think like this:
c. “I do not want this someone to think something bad about me
d. I want this someone to feel something good”
e. when people say something of this kind to someone, they think about it like this:
f. “I know that it is not true
g. I want this someone to think like this: «it is true»
h. it cannot be bad if I say something like this to this someone now
i. it is good if someone says things of this kind to someone else
j. if this someone else can feel something good because of it”
Component (a) spells out that white lies are speech acts. This is the
first part of the explication.10 The remainder specifies what people think
(though not necessarily at a conscious level) when they “say something of this
kind to someone”. Components (b)-(d) are a reference to the importance of
either establishing or preserving smooth interpersonal relations, something
that can be promoted by the creation of good feelings in the addressee. All
of this provides the impetus for a well-meant lie, with components (f)-(g)
referring to the latter (i.e., the lie) and components (h)-(j) to the fact that it
is produced with good intentions. Components (f)-(g) are a reminder of the
definition of what it means to lie, as spelled out in explication [C] above.
10 Although relative clauses (with the exception of those involving the relative pronoun
where, as in a place where many people live) are avoided in current NSM, since they are
believed to be non-universal, a decision has been made to maintain the something people
say sequence in component (a). If necessary, the component could be rephrased as people
say things of many kinds; this is one of these kinds. The matter requires more research.
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Making sense of pieux mensonges
Pieux mensonge is the French term suggested by French-Canadian lex-
icographer Michel Alfred Parmentier (2006: 24) for the Canadian French
loan translation mensonge blanc in a sentence such as Il arrive à tout le
monde de faire un mensonge blanc pour ne pas faire de peine à quelqu’un
(‘Telling a white lie so as not to upset someone is something that happens
to everyone’). Bilingual dictionaries, too, posit the two terms as transla-
tional equivalents. In its ninth edition (2010), Le Robert and Collins, for
instance, translates pieux mensonge as white lie (p. 707) and white lie as
pieux mensonge (p. 2151). Monolingual French dictionaries typically propose
definitions such as “mensonge fait à quelqu’un dans l’intention de lui épargner
quelque chose de pénible” (‘lie told to someone with the aim of sparing them
something unpleasant’; Trésor de la langue française), “[mensonge] fait dans
l’intérêt de la religion ou pour éviter un chagrin, une peine à autrui” (‘lie
told in the interest of religion or to spare someone sorrow, pain’ ; Le Robert
dictionnaire de la langue française), “[mensonge] fait dans l’intention d’être
utile ou agréable, d’éviter un chagrin, une contrariété à quelqu’un” (‘lie told
with the aim of being useful or pleasant to someone, to spare someone sorrow
or vexation’; Dictionnaire de l’Académie française, 9th edition). These are
once again very similar (with the exception of the not entirely unexpected
religious theme in the second one) to the way white lies are defined in English
dictionaries. Examples of the latter include Merriam-Webster ’s “lie about
a small or unimportant matter that someone tells to avoid hurting another
person”, the Cambridge English Dictionary ’s “lie that is told in order to be
polite or to stop someone from being upset by the truth”; and Collins ’s “[lie]
made to avoid hurting someone’s feelings or to avoid trouble, and not for an
evil purpose”.
But are the two terms, white lie and pieux mensonge, really equivalent?
The following occurrences of the latter, gleaned on the internet, suggest they
are:
Si, par exemple, quelqu’un me demande comment je trouve son nouveau t-shirt
(moche) et que je lui réponds qu’il est joli et qu’il le porte bien, est-ce un pieux mensonge
ou de l’hypocrisie? (‘If, for instance, someone asks me how I find their new t-shirt (ugly)
and I answer that it looks good and they look good in it, is that a pieux mensonge or is
it hypocrisy?’)
(https://fr.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20100818090048AAoqdoi;
accessed 11 Dec 2017)
Vos amis se sont donné beaucoup de mal mais vous n’aimez pas du tout ce qu’ils ont
préparé. La parade? Un pieux mensonge. Dites, par exemple, que vous êtes désolé mais
que vous êtes allergique à l’ingrédient principal du plat ou qu’il n’est pas compatible avec
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votre régime alimentaire. . . (‘Your friends went to a lot of trouble but you don’t like at
all what they’ve cooked. How to get out of it? A pieux mensonge. Tell them, for instance,
that you’re sorry but you’re allergic to the main ingredient of the dish or else that it isn’t
compatible with your dietary requirements. . . ’)
(http://plusmagazine.levif.be/societe/petits-diners-entre-amis-evitez-les-situations-
qui-fachent/article-normal-460597.html, accessed 11 Dec 2017)
Béal, however, claims the two concepts are different:
Le “mensonge blanc” diffère du pieux mensonge en ce qu’il n’est pas inspiré par la
compassion et peut fort bien servir les desseins de l’intéressé. Il est cependant souvent
inspiré par des considérations de tact et de politesse. (‘White lies differ from pieux
mensonges in that they are not driven by compassion and can very well be intended to
serve the interests of the liar. They are, however, often driven by considerations of tact
and politeness.’) (Béal 1993: 105; cf. also 2010: 380)
The dictionary definitions provided by Larousse (“mensonge inspiré par
un sentiment de générosité, de pitié”, ‘lie inspired by a feeling of generosity
or pity’) and by Quillet (“[mensonges] faits dans un but charitable”, ‘lies
told with a charitable aim’) also suggest there is a difference. In NSM, this
difference can be captured by replacing components (c)-(d) of explication
[G] with a single component, as in [H]. The idea of self-interest (“I do not
want this someone to think something bad about me”) that is part of white
lies but not of pieux mensonges is gone, and the compassion that is part
of pieux mensonges but not of white lies is expressed in terms of “I do not
want this someone to feel something bad”, rather than “I want this someone
to feel something good”.
[H] “un pieux mensonge” [partial explication]
a. something of one kind, something people say
b. people say something of this kind to someone when they think like this:
c. “I do not want this someone to feel something bad”
[. . . ]
Tact and politeness, on the other hand, are as much part of mensonges
pieux as they are of white lies. However, they do not rank as high in the
French ethos as they do in much of the English speaking world. I have tried
to capture this by removing the adverb often from component (b), which
now reads “people say something of this kind” rather than “people often say
something of this kind”.
As a general rule, the need to approach everyone with tact and politeness
is less keenly felt among the French, who deem franchise (‘frankness’) to
be more important, especially among people who know one another really
well. This, in turn, explains why the term pieux mensonge is less salient,
and less commonly used, than the term white lie: the speech act referred
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to as a pieux mensonge is itself not as common among the French as is, in
much of the English speaking world, the speech act referred to as a white
lie. I have written this into explication [I], which contains two entirely new
components, (b) and (c). Components (f)-(k), on the other hand, are identical
to components (e)-(j) in [G], as they reflect the thoughts or inner convictions
of the speaker when (and only when) a pieux mensonge is uttered. These
thoughts are the same as for white lies. What differs is: 1) how often they
occur – this is expressed in components (b)-(c); and 2) what the motifs are
behind them – this is expressed in components (d)-(e).11
[I] “un pieux mensonge”
a. something of one kind, something people say
b. people often say something of this kind to someone when they do not know this someone well
c. they sometimes say something of this kind to someone when they know this someone very well
d. people say something of this kind to someone when they think like this:
e. “I do not want this someone to feel something bad”
f. when people say something of this kind to someone, they think about it like this:
g. “I know that it is not true
h. I want this someone to think like this: «it is true»
i. it cannot be bad if I say something like this to this someone now
j. it is good if someone says things of this kind to someone else
k. if this someone else can feel something good because of it”
One area where compassion may eventually become an overriding factor
in favour of producing pieux mensonges is health care for the permanently
disabled or the terminally ill. This is not an area where the term white lie
is commonly used,12 but it is one where the term pieux mensonge, on the
other hand, is well established. It is perhaps the only area in which there
exists scholarly work specifically devoted to the concept of pieux mensonge.
French medical anthropologist Sylvie Fainzang’s An Anthropology of Lying,
published in 2016, is the English translation of a book originally released in
French as Fainzang (2006). In it, she describes and attempts to make sense
of the widespread practice of doctors to hide the truth from their patients
and in some cases even their families when that truth is potentially too
distressing to be faced. She refers to this practice as a form of lying, using
the term pieux mensonge, which “aims to strip the lie of any negative value”,
thus providing “justification for the doctor’s lies” (Fainzang 2016 [2006]: 54).
She notes that this justification “is also found in the English term the ‘noble
lie’ (‘noble’ because it is accomplished for a good cause)” and that English
11 The phrase know someone in components (c) and (d) is a so-called lexico-syntactic
molecule. It is not part of the basic valencies of the prime know in NSM.
12 “ ‘Lying’ to terminally ill people to spare them mental anguish can be viewed as
genuine lying” (Wierzbicka (1985: 342).
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“makes a distinction for so-called ethical lies between white lies and noble
lies” (ibid.). White lies, she says, are “lies that aim to not cause harm and
have low moral implication”, “lies in which nothing important is at stake”
(ibid.). This is obviously not the case of either noble lies or pieux mensonges,
at least in the doctor-patient relationship.13
Fainzang is not the only French-speaking scholar to have used the term
pieux mensonge in the context of the doctor-patient relationship. Equally
well-known is Grmek’s (1964) historical review of the patient’s right to know
the truth; in it, the author, a Croatian-born professor of medicine and of
medical history, argued that the pieux mensonge “was a legitimate way of
managing a patient” (Jutel 2016: 94). Another often quoted study is the
one by Geets (1984), a psychologist who used the term a couple of times.
He acknowledged that those who call for more truth in the relations to the
terminally ill are numerous, and their calls well-founded, but that nonetheless
it was not clear “which truth is [to be] spoken and which demands it makes
on the one speaking it as well as on the person who hears it”.14 The term
pieux mensonge is also used in shorter texts aimed at a broader public (e.g.,
Devers 2001; Nau 2017). However, what makes Fainzang’s work stand out is
that it looks at the two sides of the doctor-patient relationship, stressing
that not only do doctors lie to patients, but that patients also lie to doctors
(e.g., by telling them they have been taking their medication even when they
have not). Significantly, her use of the term pieux mensonge is limited to
the former type of lies, i.e. that of doctors lying to patients. They are the
ones driven by compassion, not the patients.
Why “white”? Why “pieux”?
The explications in the previous two sections are both different from and
similar to more traditional, lexicographical definitions. They differ from what
is found in dictionaries in terms of their reliance on a limited vocabulary
consisting of 65 semantically simple and universal building blocks, each with
its own combinatorial properties. This makes them easy to translate into
13 In Russian, the verb vrat’ (the less negatively valued of the two verbs corresponding
to the English verb lie) may be etymologically related to the noun vrach (‘physician,
medical doctor’). According to Mondry and Taylor (1992: 142–143), who entertain the
possibility that the link is merely “of folk-etymological status”, “[t]he conceptual link
between ‘lying’ and ‘doctor’ would be provided by the notion of ‘word’. Vrat’ is to spin out
words, while the predecessors of present-day physicians pronounced magical incantations”.
14 Quote taken from the English abstract on http://www.persee.fr/doc/thlou 0080-
2654 1984 num 15 3 2057.
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other languages, where the same 65 building blocks are found, but it also
makes them much longer than the definitions compiled by lexicographers.
They are similar to what is found in dictionaries in terms of their failure
to account, in an explicit way, for the adjective white in white lie, and the
adjective pieux in pieux mensonge.
Why are white lies called white, and pieux mensonges, pieux? Should this
information be reflected in the explications? I believe it should, but we need
to distinguish between components of meaning shared by all speakers who
are familiar with the terms white lie and pieux mensonge, and components
that may only be known to some.
All those who know and use the term white lie are aware of the various
components in explication [G], but do they also know that white lies are
called white because, in the Western world, white is traditionally seen as
a symbol of innocence, purity, goodness etc.? Many, no doubt, do. However,
we cannot be sure everyone does; for some people, it may be no more than
a phrase that, like so many others, remains unanalysed. This is the reason
why, in the expanded explication in [J], component (k) contains a suitably
modified subject: no longer “people”, as in components (b) and (e), but
“many people” (“at the same time, when they think about it, many people
can think like this”):
[J] “a white lie” [complete]
a. something of one kind, something people say
b. people often say something of this kind to someone when they think like this:
c. “I do not want this someone to think something bad about me
d. I want this someone to feel something good”
e. when people say something of this kind to someone, they think about it like this:
f. “I know it is not true
g. I want this someone to think like this: «it is true»
h. it cannot be bad if I say something like this to this someone now
i. it is good if someone says things of this kind to someone else
j. if this someone else can feel something good because of it”
k. at the same time, when they think about it, many people can think like this:
l. “for a long time, people have thought like this:
m. when something is called [m] white [m], this something cannot be bad”
No reference is made to innocence and purity; enough is said, I think,
by referring to the idea that white lies, like many other things that are
associated with the colour white, “cannot be bad”. “Be called” and “white”,
both used in component (m), are semantic molecules, i.e. “complex, but
relatively simple, meanings which function alongside semantic primes as
building blocks of meaning” (Goddard 2018: 127) and need to be explicated
separately. “Be called” is better established as a molecule than “white”, which
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is however also treated as such by Habib (2011; 2017), in his carefully crafted
explication of the category angels in Christianity.
The case of pieux mensonge is different. The adjective pieux primarily
describes people whose life and thinking is dictated by religion, in particular
(but not exclusively) by Christian ideals. By extrapolation, the adjective is
used to refer to a form of human behaviour, a way of life, and also to the
concrete actions of, or attributed to, people described as pieux. A pieux person
lies pieusement, hence produces pieux mensonges.15 But how many native
speakers of French would associate pieux mensonges with a Christian way of
life? Some might, and this is what I have tried to reflect in explication [K]:
[K] “un pieux mensonge” [complete]
a. something of one kind, something people say
b. people often say something of this kind to someone when they do not know this someone well
c. they sometimes say something of this kind to someone when they know this someone very well
d. people say something of this kind to someone when they think like this:
e. “I do not want this someone to feel something bad”
f. when people say something of this kind to someone, they think about it like this:
g. “I know it is not true
h. I want this someone to think like this: «it is true»
i. it cannot be bad if I say something like this to this someone now
j. it is good if someone says things of this kind to someone else
k. if this someone else can feel something good because of it”
l. at the same time, when they think about it, some people can think like this:
m. “some people want to live with God [m], they want to do everything as God [m] wants
n. these people can say things of this kind
o. I can do the same”
It is worth noting that, as a matter of fact, the Catholic Church, in its
teachings, rejects all forms of lying, no matter what the purpose may be.
At the same time, only the most “pious” of Catholics are likely to adhere
to that particular teaching. For most if not all native speakers of French,
whether Catholics or not, pieux mensonges are no doubt very much part of
day-to-day life, even though they are likely not to be as culturally salient as
white lies in the Anglo tradition.
Concluding remarks
While real in most cases, the distinction between white lies and pieux
mensonges is not always clear-cut. Consider the following examples:
15 Mentir pieusement is an existing verb phrase in French, unlike *to lie whitely. White
lying, on the other hand, does exist.
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Dissimuler volontairement son âge, le nombre de ses années est un pieux mensonge
qui cache très souvent le besoin d’être aimé. (‘To voluntarily hide one’s age is a pieux
mensonge that very often hides the need to be loved’)
(http://www.bienchezvous.be/bien-vivre-avouer-son-age/, accessed 11 Dec 2017)
“Avez-vous l’intention d’avoir prochainement des enfants?” C’est la question que
l’on posa à Brigitte S., 29 ans, lors d’un entretien d’embauche [. . . ]. Prise de court, elle
répondit non - alors qu’effectivement, elle envisageait d’avoir bientôt son premier enfant.
[. . . ] Brigitte S. a eu du mal à faire son pieux mensonge. (‘ “Do you intend to have children
in the immediate future?” This is the question Brigitte S., 29, was asked during a job
interview. Taken by surprise, she said no – even though she envisaged to have her first
child soon. Brigitte S. found it difficult to tell a pieux mensonge.’)
(https://www.monster.ch/fr/conseil-carriere/article/entretien-d-embauche-les-
mensonges-sont-permis-29330, accessed 11 Dec 2017)
Perhaps, the days of the pieux mensonge in which self-interest plays no
role are counted. The phrase may well be on its way to becoming opaque,
significantly more so than its English counterpart white lie, which for most
people remains relatively transparent. Like so many other languages, French
is exposed to continuous influence from English. It does not have to borrow
words and meanings; sometimes, surreptitiously, its speakers just borrow
meanings and impose them on existing French phrases that, originally, meant
something at least a little different.
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Angielskie (white) lies i francuskie (pieux) mensonges.
Etnolingwistyczne rozważania o niemówieniu prawdy
Fakt, iż w większości języków europejskich istnieją słowa podobne do angielskiego lie
‘kłamać’ sugeruje, że jest to uniwersalna kategoria poznawcza. Może się zatem wydawać,
że wszyscy ludzie intuicyjnie rozumieją, czym jest lying ‘kłamstwo’ i że wszelkie formy dys-
kursu, w których ma miejsce mijanie się z prawdą, bez względu na ich pochodzenie, można
uznać za formę lying. To jednak mit – różnice istnieją nawet w Europie, a w miarę, jak się
od niej oddalamy, stają się coraz wyraźniejsze. Na przykład w opartym na angielszczyźnie
melanezyjskim kreolskim języku bislama nie występuje ścisły odpowiednik angielskiego
lie – najbliższym słowem jest czasownik giaman, który w przeciwieństwie do lie oznacza
dosyć powszechnie akceptowany, czasami wręcz konieczny sposób postępowania. Z drugiej
strony, przynajmniej z anglocentrycznego punktu widzenia, chociaż lying najczęściej
odbierane jest jako moralnie naganne, istnieją przypadki, gdzie nie jest to oczywiste.
Niektóre kłamstwa uznaje się za nie tak złe, jak inne – określa się je jako white lies ‘białe
kłamstwa’ (istnieją także inne sformułowania, jednak to jest najczęstsze i najbardziej
wyraziste kulturowo). Czy pojęcie to występuje w innych językach, np. we francuskim?
W języku tym istnieje wyrażenie pieux mensonge, dosł. ‘pobożne kłamstwo’. W artykule
staram się wykazać, iż semantyka wyrażeń white lies i pieux mensonges częściowo się
pokrywa, lecz także, że mają one inne konotacje, które opisuję za pomocą Naturalnego
Metajęzyka Semantycznego.
Słowa kluczowe: lying ; white lies; pieux mensonges; Naturalny Metajęzyk
Semantyczny; różnice międzykulturowe
